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ORIGINAL PAPER
Demarcation, instantiation, and individual traits: Realist 
social ontology for mental disorders
Polaris Koi
Philosophy, University of Turku, Turku, Finland
ABSTRACT
Realists about mental disorder have been hasty about dismiss-
ing social explanations of how mental disorder is constituted. 
However, many social ontologies are realist ontologies. In order 
to create a meaningful distinction between realism and social 
metaphysics about mental disorder, I propose that realism 
about mental disorder is best understood as Individual Trait 
Realism (ITR) about them. For ITR, mental disorders exist in 
virtue of traits. I defend the view that ITR is compatible with 
social metaphysics, arguing that, in asking whether constituents 
in the social sphere figure the metaphysics of psychopathology, 
we are asking questions on three different strata of explanation: 
the strata of demarcation, instantiation, and individual traits. 
Distinguishing between these strata allows for nuanced realism 
that need not reject the social constitution of mental disorder.
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There is a rich ontological debate concerning whether, and how, mental 
disorders are real. For the purposes of this paper, “mental disorder” is used 
as an umbrella term encompassing both mental disabilities, characterized by 
their relative persistence, and more transient forms of pathologized mental 
functioning. Here are two examples of mental disorder. 
Example 1: ADHD. Pete often feels restless, including in settings where this 
infringes on his ability to complete various goals. He is impulsive and has 
considerable trouble concentrating on tasks at work. He often speaks out of 
turn, causing problems in social settings, including romantic relationships. 
Pete was diagnosed with Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder as a child 
and continues to have ADHD.
Example 2: MDD. Emma experiences sadness or hopelessness almost 
every day. She suffers from insomnia, and sometimes, she thinks about self- 
harm. Emma’s friend has suggested she visits a mental health professional, 
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but she thinks it pointless because she does not believe that she could be 
helped. If Emma were assessed by a clinician, Emma would be diagnosed 
with Major Depressive Disorder (MDD).
Many philosophers feel that there are pressing reasons to argue for 
realism about mental disorders, such as defending the legitimacy of psy-
chiatry as a science and improving psychiatric praxis.1 By realism about 
mental disorders, I mean the stance that for at least some mental disorders, 
their description is not exhausted by reference to our beliefs and that they 
therefore are a legitimate target of study and intervention for psychiatry.
Mental disorders like Emma’s MDD and Pete’s ADHD are sometimes 
called social constructs: phenomena whose existence is in some sense 
dependent on the social sphere. Social constructionism is the view according 
to which various phenomena arise from the social sphere and could not exist 
independently of it.
Sometimes, social constructionism is taken as the causal claim that the 
referent of X is a product of the social sphere, either because social factors 
brought it about or because social factors shaped it to be a specific way. This 
can be contrasted with social constructionism in the constitutive sense, 
which claims that X denotes something that is (or necessarily involves) 
a social structure. Since the causal construction claim about mental disorder 
is not controversial, in this paper, the focus is on constitutive social con-
struction, i.e. social ontology.2
Realism about mental disorder is often contrasted with social construc-
tionism. Social constructionist stances are sometimes described as antireal-
ist, albeit that is not always the case. Realists about mental disorder,3 
however, want to defend a conception of mental disorder that is not 
exhausted by social structures: a conception of mental illness in which it, 
like somatic illness, is at least partially constituted by states of affairs 
pertaining to the biological individual, such as anatomical structures, 
mechanisms, behavioral traits, and symptoms. Realists about mental dis-
order are dissatisfied with stances that characterize mental illness as human 
artifice, even if this artifice is a robust social structure inescapably embedded 
in our culture.
The purpose of this paper is to make two connected contributions: first, 
to show that the debate concerning the metaphysics of mental disorders is 
not concerned with one but with three distinct explanatory challenges: 
disorder demarcation, determining whether a given case instantiates 
a given disorder, and explaining the individual traits that constitute mental 
disorders and second, to suggest that in order to make sense of the debate, 
the pool of views that are usually labeled as realism about mental disorders 
are best understood as Individual Trait Realism (ITR) about them. For ITR 
about mental disorders, these disorders are metaphysically dependent on 
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individual traits. The metaphysical commitments uniting realists about 
mental disorder are, for this reading, primarily concerned with the traits 
that constitute disorder.
”Individual traits,” here, is shorthand for phenotypic traits subject to 
individual variance within a population. Any phenotypic trait that is subject 
to variance within a population (such as height, hippocampal volume, 
handedness, extraversion, suicidal ideation, or being divorced) is an indivi-
dual trait in this sense. For mental disorders, some individual traits are 
labeled as the symptoms of these disorders: for example, high impulsivity is 
a trait that is also a symptom of Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder.
In my analysis, proponents of ITR want some of the individual traits that 
Pete has, such as his restlessness, his impulsivity, or his anomalous cortical 
thickness, to play a constitutive role in his ADHD. They want to say ADHD 
is metaphysically dependent on at least some such traits or combinations of 
traits (although ADHD may not be exhausted by these traits). They further-
more want to say that if Pete had no such traits, Pete would not have ADHD; 
and were no one to have such traits, ADHD would not exist. As a result, for 
proponents of ITR, improving psychiatry requires looking at the traits that 
patients have, and patients have mental disorders on grounds of the indivi-
dual traits that they have.
In what follows, I will first demonstrate that realism in the standard sense 
does not stand in a meaningful contrast to social metaphysics and introduce 
the distinction between the strata of demarcation, instantiation, and indivi-
dual traits in section 2. In section 3, I will then develop ITR and explicate the 
concept of trait involved and justify locating realist commitments in traits 
rather than the other strata discussed. Section 4 is devoted to the metaphy-
sics of traits, whereas in section 5, the metaphysics of demarcation and 
instantiation is discussed. The analysis presented in this paper demonstrates 
that even as realism about mental disorders, understood as ITR, forms 
a meaningful contrast to social metaphysics, they are robustly compatible.
2. Social construction and the realist challenge: Not one but three 
controversies
For realists about mental disorder, Emma’s MDD and Pete’s ADHD are 
something our theorizing and scientific efforts seek to properly capture, 
rather than something constructed by these pursuits. By realism about 
mental disorders, I mean the stance that for at least some mental dis-
orders, their description is not exhausted by reference to our beliefs and 
that they therefore are a legitimate target of study and intervention for 
psychiatry. A standard approach to the notion of ”real” would be some-
thing that is independent of our beliefs about it (see, e.g., Kendler et al., 
2011, p. 1145).
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In their quest to ground mental disorder on belief-independent facts, 
realists about mental disorders often find themselves pressed to reject social 
accounts of mental disorder, which are sometimes associated with attempts 
to delegitimize psychiatry and to instead endorse a biology-centric concep-
tion of mental disorder (see, e.g., Fellowes, 2019; Kendler et al., 2011; 
Schaffner, 2013). This move is motivated by the notion that belief- 
independent facts are more readily found within a biologically minded 
methodology than within an approach emphasizing the social sphere.
According to the above standard notion, ”real” facts are belief- 
independent facts. However, it would be a mistake to confuse social meta-
physics with belief-dependence. For example, in Haslanger’s (2016) struc-
turalist account, facts about social structures would still obtain even if we, as 
a culture, were sociologically inept and unaware of these facts. Haslangerian 
social structures are therefore ”real” in this standard sense.4 In other words, 
realism in the standard sense of holding that the phenomena at hand are 
belief-independent does not form a meaningful contrast to social construc-
tionism because some theories of social construction fall under realism in 
that standard sense. Such theories are unsatisfactory for those who wish to 
defend mental disorders as something that is not exhausted by the social 
sphere, but that also necessarily involves culture-independent states of 
affairs – in the case of mental disorders, facts about human (neuro)biology. 
However, a meaningful contrast to social construction can be drawn by 
qualifying realism about mental disorder as locating its commitments in 
traits subject to individual variation – a task I will take on in section 3.
Mental disorders are often seen as both biological and social, as exempli-
fied by the ”biopsychosocial model.” The idea that belief-independent states 
of affairs have a foundational role in the metaphysics of social phenomena is 
widespread in both scientific and lay discourse concerning mental disorders. 
It is common to talk of ”the physiological basis,” ”the genetic correlates” or 
”the underlying neurobiology” of mental disorders, while granting that 
these disorders are largely socially caused or constituted. Schaffner and 
Tabb (2014) call such stances inclusionary social constructionism, by 
which they mean stances where the social construction of mental disorder 
is seen as compatible with granting physiological etiologies and constituents 
for mental disorder as well as with treating psychiatry as a legitimate science; 
they contrast these with what they term exclusionary social constructionist 
stances, which assert that mental disorders are mere social structures and 
better suited for topics of sociological than medical research. For inclusion-
ary social constructionism, social constructs can be real and biological.
However, as the lack of contrast between realism in the standard sense 
and social constructionism demonstrates, what it is for a disorder to be 
real remains unclear. This is because multiple objects of inquiry are 
conflated in this question. In asking whether mental disorder is real, or 
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how biological and social phenomena figure in the ontology of mental 
disorder, we are asking – and sometimes conflating – a variety of ques-
tions, such as what is the ontology of diagnostic categories? What is the 
ontology of Pete’s ADHD? How come Emma instantiates MDD? When 
does the clinical community consider a mental disorder real? When is it 
right in considering it real?
To make better sense of this pool of questions, I suggest we distinguish 
between three strata of metaphysical explanation, each with its own distinct 
explanandum:
(1) The demarcation stratum, on which the ontology of mental disorders qua cate-
gories is analyzed.
(2) The instantiation stratum, on which explanation is sought concerning on which 
grounds certain individuals, and not others, are picked out as members of the 
category at hand.
(3) The individual trait stratum, on which we examine the ontology of the traits that 
ground diagnosis.
There are two reasons why philosophers ought to distinguish between these 
three strata. First, making this distinction enables a split view concerning 
the ontology of mental disorder. A philosopher may, e.g., wish to defend 
a social ontology of mental disorder in terms of instantiation and demarca-
tion yet be a neuroreductionist concerning the stratum of individual traits. 
Indeed, as I will argue in section 3, realist commitments about mental 
disorder are best understood as attached to the individual trait stratum, as 
the claim that certain traits subject to individual variance are the necessary 
constituents of mental disorder.
Second, while it is possible to defend, e.g., a social ontology of mental 
disorder across all three explanatory levels, extending the same analysis 
from one stratum to other strata may yield implausibly heavy-handed 
results. For example, the pragmatist stance that mental disorder categories 
are human artifices, conceptual tools to be negotiated and refined based on 
their usefulness (Varelius, 2009; Zachar, 2002) is a stance concerning mental 
disorder on the demarcation stratum. However, it does not necessarily 
follow that individual traits are similarly constructed. And vice versa, it is 
often pointed out that the ontology of most or all individual traits crucially 
involves biological facts such as facts concerning the individual’s genotype 
and neuroanatomy. Yet it does not follow that the ontology of the demarca-
tion of the mental disorders associated with these traits should involve these 
traits; if it is, a distinct explanation is needed for why that is so. The 
metaphysics of mental disorder categories are often disanalogous with the 
metaphysics of the relevant traits.
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I will now turn to the topic of individual traits, explicating what they are, 
why they are so central to realism about mental disorders, and outlining 
aspects of their metaphysics. Toward the end of this paper, I will return to 
the strata of demarcation and instantiation.
3. Realism about mental disorder is best understood as Individual Trait 
Realism about it
While realists about mental disorder hold a range of heterogenous views, 
there is a point of agreement, though often implicit, among realists about 
mental disorder. By explicating this point of agreement, realism can be 
qualified to form a meaningful contrast to exclusionary social construction-
ism. This implicit point of agreement is that individual traits are necessary 
constituents of mental disorder. That there is a strong relationship between 
traits and mental disorders has been vindicated in various, contrasting ways, 
e.g., in terms of essences (Kendell & Jablensky, 2003) and using Boyd’s 
(1991) concept of homeostatic property clusters (Kendler et al., 2011; 
Beebee & Sabbarton-Leary, 2010; see also Fellowes, 2019).
Realists about mental disorder share the stance that real mental disorders 
necessarily have some individual traits as their metaphysical constituents. 
I term this position Individual Trait Realism (ITR for short). Realists about 
mental disorder are best understood as Individual Trait Realists about it. 
I formulate ITR as follows:
Individual Trait Realism: For X to be real is for X to exist in virtue of individual traits Y.
Thus, for ITR about mental disorders, mental disorders X exist in virtue of 
individual traits Y. The set of traits Y should not, however, be arbitrary; 
instead, whether a given trait or set of traits qualifies as a constituent of 
mental disorders, is subject to controversy among realists.
To explicate what this entails, I will expand on each aspect of this 
formulation, starting with the concept of individual trait that is doing the 
work here.5
In biology, ”trait” denotes various phenotypic features of an organism, 
ranging from the physiological (such as bone density, hair color, or the mass 
of the cerebellum) to the behavioral and psychological (such as nesting 
behavior in birds or neuroticism in humans). Some phenotypic traits are 
persistent (e.g., Pete’s forgetfulness, height, and eye color), whereas others 
are only displayed transiently (e.g., Emma’s suicidal ideation, marriage, and 
infant wheezing). Both the genotype and the environment play a robust role 
in the production of traits. Some traits are shared features of a species. Other 
traits, however, are subject to individual variation. Traits that are subject to 
individual variation – individual traits for short – are what psychopathology 
is interested in since shared traits will not do as markers of illness.6 
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Individual traits relevant to psychopathology include symptoms (such as 
Pete’s forgetfulness and Emma’s suicidal ideation), personality traits (such 
as Pete’s impulsivity), and physiological traits (such as atypical cortical 
thickness). In brief, the concept of trait is here used in its broad, biological 
sense.7
The trait concept in biology has itself been a subject of some confusion 
(see, e.g., Violle et al., 2007). Here, I adopt the standard definition of trait as 
any state or feature of the individual organism, whether morphological, 
physiological, or behavioral, that is measurable at the individual level. 
Measurability, here, denotes simply that there are some means of assessing 
the presence of a trait or in the case of quantitative traits, its state. For 
example, extraversion can be measured using psychometric questionnaires, 
and the height, weight, and bone density of an organism can be measured 
using various methods in biometrics.
Phenotypic traits are contrasted with the genotype. This contrast was 
originally twofold: in addition to a contrast between the cause and the effect, 
traits were contrasted to genes in that traits were observable in a way that 
genes, historically, were not. With the advent of improved genetic technol-
ogies, this latter contrast no longer holds true. That the genotype is not 
considered a trait is, rather, a matter of convention.
When ITR asserts that mental disorders X are real when they exist in 
virtue of individual traits Y, it simply means that they exist in virtue of 
certain traits of individual organisms that are subject to variance within 
a population. For example, for ITR, Major Depressive Disorder exists in 
virtue of a set of traits that may include such as traits depressed mood, 
suicidal ideation, dopamine dysregulation, and insomnia. For ITR, a mental 
disorder is real when there is in fact such a set of traits that it exists in virtue 
of and that are subject to individual variance rather than universal to the 
human species.
Even as this claim (unlike the standard realist claim) stands at a stark 
contrast to exclusionary social constructionism, it is a modest claim. ITR 
does not assert that X would exist solely in virtue of Y or be reducible to Y – 
those are stronger claims that are not involved in ITR, but rather, are 
compatible with it. To reiterate, for ITR, X may be metaphysically depen-
dent on other states of affairs in addition to traits Y. Additionally, the 
contingent constituents of X may include a wide variety of states of affairs 
and traits in addition to the traits Y that it exists in virtue of. However, what 
ITR does assert is that traits Y are required for X. According to ITR, if, for 
example, MDD turned out not to exist in virtue of individual traits Y, it 
would not be a real mental disorder: if it existed in virtue of traits shared by 
humans, it would be an aspect of the human condition rather than 
a disorder. If it existed solely in virtue of social structures and institutions, 
it would be a cultural artifact rather than a disorder.8
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Now that the formulation of ITR has been clarified, I turn to controversy, 
rather than consensus, among realists. Realists about mental disorder 
further agree that the set of traits Y must be qualified in some way, to 
foreclose ways to pick out sets of individual traits Y that would be a poor fit 
for a realist approach to psychopathology. Without such a qualifier, ITR 
would be overly inclusive. There is a need to restrict what sorts of traits 
qualify as constituents for mental disorders for ITR: otherwise, the group of 
traits Y may be selected via means that are either arbitrary or otherwise unfit 
for the task given that mental disorders are intended to be viable targets for 
scientific inquiry.
One such unfit approach would be institutionalism, for which the traits 
relevant for mental disorder would be picked out as constituents of X by 
institutional agreement: for example, that trouble staying on task is 
a constituent of ADHD solely because that was agreed by majority vote at 
a meeting of the Psychiatric Association. Most realists about mental dis-
order would be unhappy with institutionalism, as they hold that mental 
disorders are not, or at least are not solely, a product of institutional 
exercises of power but rather something that institutionalized practices, 
such as medical science, seek to understand. If psychiatrists agree that 
trouble staying on task is a constituent of ADHD, realists hope that this is 
because they have discovered that this is so, not solely because they have 
exercised their institutional power to decree that this is so.
There are multiple competing realist approaches to restricting what sorts 
of traits or sets of traits qualify for inclusion in the set of traits Y. Here, 
I remain agnostic about what exactly is the best qualifier for selecting traits 
Y. Instead, for the remainder of this section, I will describe and discuss some 
prominent candidate qualifiers.
One candidate qualifier is the one put forth within neuroreductionist 
stances about mental disorder. For it, a fitting individual trait is a trait 
reducible to neurobiology (in whatever sense of ”reducible” the reductionist 
endorses). But ITR need not be reductionist. The mechanistic property 
cluster model (Kendler et al., 2011) and the network model (Borsboom 
et al., 2019) are examples of nonreductionist ITR stances about mental 
disorder, for each of which the relevant qualifier is that there are the right 
sorts of causal connections among the candidate traits. For example, 
Borsboom et al. (2019) profess that “mental disorders are not brain dis-
orders at all” (ibid.: 2). They found this assertion on a network approach to 
mental disorder where mental disorders are caused by and consist of 
causally related symptoms. These symptoms may be generated by neuro-
biological dysfunction, but they may also arise from external states of affairs. 
For the network model, what triggered the symptom in the first place is less 
important than the causal links among symptoms that cause the disorder to 
continue to exist.
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The network approach draws on the work of Kendler et al. (2011), who 
offer a rejection of both essentialism9 and social constructionism about 
mental disorder, as well as a nuanced argument for accounting for it in 
terms of mechanisms. Kendler, Zachar, and Craver reject social construc-
tion on grounds that while it “offers a revealing view of how psychiatric 
symptoms are related to social context,” it also “neglects insight into the 
underlying genetic, physiological and psychological factors that are often 
shared among particular cases” (ibid.: 1146). (These charges are valid con-
cerning exclusionary social constructionism, but it is a mistake to apply 
them to social constructionism tout court.) They then proceed to apply 
a concept developed for describing such complex mechanisms, that of 
mechanistic property cluster (MPC), to analyze mental disorder. On the 
MPC account, developmental, genetic, and other causal mechanisms 
together produce, not a single set of traits, but a loose and imperfectly 
shared cluster of traits. Kendler, Zachar, and Craver use MDD as an 
example, where the symptoms of suicidal ideation, feelings of guilt and 
depressed mood are causally interrelated (2011: 1147). For the MPC account 
of mental disorder, mental disorders X exist in virtue of individual traits that 
cluster together in a self-sustaining causal process. This causal clustering is 
what qualifies these traits as ITR constituents for mental disorders.
Causal clustering and reducibility are two examples of qualifiers that 
realists can propose for traits Y in order to rule out arbitrary and institu-
tional selection of traits Y. For both qualifiers, certain features of the traits, 
such as the reliable correlation between a neural phenomenon and an overt 
trait or the reliable causal clustering of a set of traits, are the features that 
make these traits fitting constituents for mental disorder.
While realisms about mental disorder are varied, they come together in 
vindicating the necessary role of individual traits in the metaphysics of 
psychopathology. To meaningfully distinguish these realisms from the 
application of realist, exclusionary social ontologies to mental disorder, 
accounts ordinarily described as realist accounts of mental disorder (such 
as reductionist, essentialist, MPC, and network accounts) are best under-
stood as ITR accounts of mental disorder.
4. The metaphysics of traits
In section 2, I claimed that the debate concerning the metaphysics of mental 
disorder ought to be understood as three distinct debates: one about dis-
order demarcation, one about instantiation, and one concerning the meta-
physics of the individual traits that ground disorder. Above, I have clarified 
the concept of individual trait and set out the conception of individual traits 
that I believe unites realism about mental disorder. I next discuss the 
metaphysics of individual traits as constituents of mental disorder. If the 
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conception of individual trait is that which is outlined above, what meta-
physical commitments follow? Must individual traits be in some sense 
”biological?” Can they instead be socially constituted? Is there space for 
both?
While the metaphysics of individual traits seems like a fairly theoretical 
topic of discussion, it remains central for debates concerning mental dis-
order, its demarcation, and proper care. For example, within the public 
debates surrounding ADHD and MDD, typical charges are that some traits, 
such as hyperactivity or feelings of hopelessness, really only denote ordinary 
behavior under certain circumstances: boys without sufficient support at 
home may act out in school, and are then described as ”hyperactive,” 
whereas young adults, facing global warming and employment difficulties, 
experience hopelessness that is warranted but are mistakenly told that 
instead of a societal crisis, they are facing a personal one. The friction in 
these examples stems from disagreement regarding whether characteristics 
such as Pete’s hyperactivity and Emma’s hopelessness really qualify as 
individual traits or whether they instead collapse into shared traits (the 
”human condition”), into social structures and norms, or into 
a combination of the two.10
It is harder to give a sweeping account about the ontology of individual 
traits than it is of the ontology of mental disorders. This is because indivi-
dual trait is an extremely broad concept. Fashioning a detailed unitary 
description of the ontology of traits therefore appears a futile exercise: it 
should be obvious that there are meaningful differences between the meta-
physics of traits such as cortical volume and traits such as Emma’s sadness 
or Pete’s hyperactivity. However, some broad strokes can be painted, and 
some distinctions made.
For ITR, mental disorders qualify as real when they exist in virtue of 
individual traits Y. Proponents of ITR must hold that these individual traits 
are real because for X to exist in virtue of something else, that something 
must also be real. Likewise, for ITR accounts that propose mechanistic or 
interactive relationships among the traits, such as network and MPC mod-
els, the individual traits must be real in order to act as causes (Eronen, 2019).
What, then, is meant by the assertion that an individual trait is real? I am 
using biological language to describe individual traits and ITR, and this may 
lead one to wonder whether I am endorsing the idea that individual traits 
must be ”biological.” The answer is ”yes” only in a trivial sense. As humans 
are organisms, all human traits, from being a redhead to being a bank teller, 
are biological in the trivial sense of the word. But insofar as ”biological” is 
used to denote something narrower, such as ”physiological,” traits need not 
be .”biological.” The concept of trait includes traits such as being a bank 
teller, a widower, or a juvenile delinquent: all of these are features of humans 
subject to individual variance, and noncontroversially belong in the social 
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sphere. However, a proponent of ITR may opt to use “biological” qualifiers 
in restricting what sorts of sets of traits are suitable as constituents of mental 
disorder: one may, for example, choose to only include traits that are 
measurable using biometric means.
While such a physiology-centric view would qualify as a form of ITR, it is 
not my intention to endorse it. Rather, my intent is to demonstrate that 
mindfulness of human biology need not foreclose social ontology. There are 
multiple ways in which social factors may enter into mental disorders. Many 
of these pertain to instantiation and demarcation and are not terribly 
controversial. But perhaps surprisingly, social constituents may also factor 
into the very individual traits that constitute mental disorder.
First, there are various social structures, such as structures of stigmatiza-
tion, that aggravate the burden of persons with mental disorders. For some 
mental disorders, aggravated distress will result in an aggravated disorder, as 
various forms of distress are characteristic of most mental disorders. For 
those mental disorders, the distress may be partly caused and constituted by 
a response to the stigmatization experienced by the individuals at hand; in 
such cases, distress-related traits are partly or wholly social. For Emma, such 
traits are feelings of worthlessness and self-blame: in addition to her other 
feelings of worthlessness and self-blame, she may have further such feelings 
that are a response to her stigma. For Pete, his restlessness may be such 
a trait: part of Pete’s restlessness may be a response to anxiety about meeting 
social expectations.
Social structures have a constitutive role in some or all individual traits 
beyond the distress experienced by persons with the disorders. For example, 
Pete’s tendency to speak out of turn is a phenomenon located in the social 
sphere: speaking out of turn is a social phenomenon, as it is the social 
conventions that determine whose turn it is to speak.
Above, I have provided evidence that some individual traits that are 
constituents for mental disorders under the current classification are social 
traits. However, a turn toward individual traits can also enable an examina-
tion of the nature of these traits with less emphasis on current diagnostic 
categories, which some hope would enable the generation of novel diag-
nostic categories that line up with neurobiological traits rather than social 
traits. The Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) movement is one example of 
this trend (Insel & Cuthbert, 2015; Tabb, 2019). Unhappy with our present 
demarcation of mental disorder, proponents of RDoC wish to assert that 
real disorders exist in virtue of the neurobiological individual traits they 
consist in, even if our present ideas concerning these disorders are imper-
fect. The hope of the RDoC movement is that purely physiological and 
causal descriptions of mental disorders would yield their redefinition as 
brain circuit disorders (Insel & Cuthbert, 2015). Such strict reductionism is 
one form of ITR: it is conceptually consistent to narrow down the group of 
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traits Y to physiological ones. However, as we will see, it is not viable as a full 
description of mental disorder. Even as it is a conceptually coherent stance 
on the stratum of individual traits (albeit one that will require empirical 
substantiation), it is unsuitable for the strata of instantiation or 
demarcation.
5. Demarcation and instantiation
It is not unusual to expect disorder demarcation or instantiation to be 
equivalent to, or analogous with, the stratum of individual traits in terms 
of their metaphysics. Here, I will first describe the strata of demarcation and 
instantiation more fully and then proceed to discuss some instances of how 
the strata are muddled in the literature, suggesting that distinguishing 
between these three strata alters the implications of the cases discussed.
Most philosophical work on mental disorder has been focused on the 
demarcation stratum. Ontological questions on the demarcation stratum 
revolve around the ontology of the category of mental disorder generally or 
around specific disorder categories such as Major Depressive Disorder. We 
may, for example, ask whether these are natural kind categories, i.e. whether 
these categories are based on a grouping that is independent of language and 
human interaction, or whether these categories emerge solely from such 
interaction.
That the ontology of demarcation is social is trivially true because lan-
guage is social, and demarcation is something we do with language. The 
debate about demarcation does not, however, concern this trivial sense of 
social ontology, but rather, the more philosophically interesting question of 
whether our categories necessarily are shaped by social factors, such as the 
cultural history of these categories or the practical work we aim to do with 
them.
The demarcation of some phenomena seems to be guided not only by 
sociohistorical contingency but also by the belief-independent nature of 
the universe that any language or culture would strive to capture. One 
might assume, for example, that any society possessing an advanced 
scientific enterprise would sooner or later have concepts for protons, 
electrons, and neutrons. If they would define the atom differently enough, 
we might respond that they have not observed it correctly: there are 
certain stable facts about atoms that science can perceive and that are 
consistent across time, space, and culture. The thrust of the demarcation 
debate has been that our present demarcation of mental disorder appears 
not to be directed by correspondingly stable facts. While some, such as 
Zachar (2014), are ready to embrace this state of affairs, others (such as 
Insel & Cuthbert, 2015) have called for a radical revision of our psychiatric 
categories.
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Assuming that the correspondingly stable facts driving the demarcation 
of mental disorder are individual traits, a proponent of ITR could argue that 
disorder categories exist in virtue of certain individual traits, arising from 
our need to describe what we observe in the world. However, while demar-
cation should evolve as our understanding of mental disorders evolves, 
excising the social from the demarcation of mental disorders appears as 
an overly ambitious aim. Here, I make use of Kendler’s (2016) discussion on 
disorder demarcation. In their efforts to biologize psychiatric categories, 
proponents of reductionism are prone to overlook that categories denoting 
complex biological phenomena do not, and cannot, neatly match culture- 
independent states of affairs. Kendler’s charge is that the project of revising 
psychiatric categories to be independent of the social sphere is impossible 
because mental disorders, like many if not all biological categories, char-
acterize heterogeneous sets with fuzzy boundaries.11
This does not entail that the broad concept of mental disorder or the 
more specific concept of MDD would be invalid or that it would not pick 
out any individual traits. Rather, the upshot is that due to its fuzzy bound-
aries and internal heterogeneity, the scope of the concept will necessarily be 
subject to negotiation and renegotiation. Therefore, the social sphere neces-
sarily enters into the demarcation of mental disorders. Disorder categories 
are nontrivial social constructs and will be such even if a RDoC-style 
revision is carried out.
So much about demarcation; what, then, about instantiation? Ontological 
questions on the instantiation stratum concern how individuals are identified as 
members of categories – for mental disorder, how they are identified as having 
a disorder. Instantiation seems straightforward: with the demarcation criteria in 
mind, we look at a given population and pick out people who satisfy the 
demarcation criteria. Pete is picked out as having ADHD because of individual 
differences and traits – e.g. that Pete is impulsive – that figure as diagnostic 
criteria for the diagnostic category of ADHD, and this constellation of traits 
then is an instance of ADHD. However, as I will argue below, the instantiation 
of mental disorders additionally necessarily includes the social sphere.
Even if a purely physiological description of a given mental disorder 
could be fashioned, such a description would not be a full or apt description 
of the individual traits that ground the disorder. Specific neurobiological 
traits, in the relevant social contexts, can produce the kinds of behavioral 
traits that constitute ADHD, but it is these behaviors – characterized by 
their lack of conformity to specific social expectations about individual 
behavior – that form the grounds on which ADHD, as we typically under-
stand it, is instantiated.
Consider a scenario where the neural underpinnings of ADHD have 
become magnificently clear, and the disorder can now be demarcated with 
reference to neuroanatomical traits alone: a veritable (and plausibly 
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altogether unfeasible) feat for science. Now, consider a person who has the 
signature neurobiology but has never displayed any of the behavioral fea-
tures of ADHD. It would be counterintuitive to say that such a person has 
ADHD, or if one were to insist that these neural traits suffice for ADHD, the 
term ADHD would then denote two distinct concepts – one neurobiological 
and one behavioral – which would not always line up. It is hard to predict 
which concept we would give priority to in such a case; however, describing 
neurobiological variance in the absence of pathologized functioning as 
a disorder seems false. As a result, behavioral traits appear to have explana-
tory primacy for ADHD even if neural traits are de facto constituents 
thereof.
For behavioral traits, the social sphere plays a crucial role in assessing 
whether these traits constitute features of a pathology. Consider the descrip-
tion of Major Depressive Disorder in DSM-V, which states that “responses 
to a significant loss (e.g., bereavement, financial ruin, losses from a natural 
disaster, a serious medical illness or disability)” (DSM-V: 161) can elicit an 
affective and behavioral response resembling Major Depressive Disorder. 
DSM-V further advises that whether the individual is depressed in addition 
to grieving should be considered by the clinician “based on the individual’s 
history and the cultural norms for the expression of distress in the context of 
loss” (ibid.). For example, whether Emma has MDD depends in part on her 
social circumstances. Were Emma to have the same symptoms of sadness, 
hopelessness, insomnia, and suicidal ideation in response to losing her 
home and family in a military conflict, those individual traits would stand 
in a very different relationship to the social environment, since these 
behavioral traits would likely be seen as nonpathological in such 
a harrowing situation. Whether Emma instantiates MDD therefore depends 
not just on disorder demarcation and on the individual traits at hand, but 
also on Emma’s immediate social context.
Davies (2016) has argued for the same effect by claiming that whether 
behavioral dispositions become manifest as behavioral traits also hinge on 
the social sphere. To this effect, Davies presents a thought experiment 
where an individual, possessing every disposition to act in a manner 
constitutive of Oppositional Defiant Disorder (ODD), is placed in an 
egalitarian utopia where there are no opportunities for authority-defying 
behavior. Davies concludes that since the individual will not display these 
behavioral traits in such a utopia, it is not possible for the individual to 
have ODD in such a social environment and that this is evidence that 
mental disorder involves a “relation to certain kinds, events, individuals, 
practices or institutions” (Davies, 2016, p. 291) in the individual’s social 
and natural environment.12 While Davies presents the argument as one 
about mental disorder generally, it is, more specifically, an argument 
about disorder instantiation.
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The assertion that the instantiation of mental disorder involves the social 
context is often countered with the objection that some mental disorders, 
such as schizophrenia, present similarly across cultures (see, e.g., Kendler 
et al., 2011). These observations, however, are compatible. The empirical 
claim that schizophrenia presents similarly across cultures does not mean 
that all cultures would have the same concept of schizophrenia: it is not 
a claim about demarcation. It can be consistently read as a claim about 
instantiation: we could postulate that even if the concept of schizophrenia 
would not be available to a specific individual nor to her surrounding 
culture, this counts as an instance of our concept of schizophrenia. Yet its 
most intuitive application is as a claim about individual traits. 
A neuroreductionist would articulate this claim as follows: the neural under-
pinnings of schizophrenia are the same regardless of culture. A proponent of 
the MPC or network model could instead say that specific individual traits – 
the ones we associate with the disorder – cluster together across cultures. 
That this cross-culturality would entail that the same disorder is instantiated 
across cultures is an attractive claim and a useful hypothesis. However, this 
hypothesis is not confirmed simply by the observation regarding the cross- 
cultural clustering of individual traits unless one makes the further claim 
that such clustering is sufficient for something to instantiate mental disorder 
X. That claim, while consistent, seems unnecessarily heavy-handed. A more 
nuanced picture of disorder instantiation describes it as metaphysically 
dependent not just on individual traits, but also on the social sphere.13
The idea that the instantiation of mental disorders would be dependent on 
social contexts is resisted largely because it is taken to entail that instantiation 
would be arbitrary and to lead to a cultural relativist view on mental disorders. 
However, this worry is unwarranted. First, one can hold instantiation to occur 
in virtue of both social and nonsocial constituents. Second, even the claim that 
the instantiation of some disorder is exclusively social in ontology does not 
entail that instantiation would be arbitrary because culture is not arbitrary: it, 
too, is subject to a variety of causal structures.
With the three strata of demarcation, instantiation, and individual traits 
having been clarified, I wish to show that this clarification has not been in vain 
as these strata are sometimes confused, conflated, or expected to be analogous. 
Here, I raise two examples of such conflation, one constructionist and one 
reductionist, from within the debate concerning the metaphysics of ADHD.
Vehmas and Mäkelä (2009), in their discussion of the metaphysics of 
disabilities, assert that while disorders like Down syndrome/trisomy 21 
involve both language-independent and social facts, ones like ADHD 
where no unitary biological cause has been found “are wholly language 
dependent because the corresponding facts are language dependent” 
(2009: 50) – the corresponding facts, for Vehmas & Mäkelä, being the 
referents of the diagnostic criteria. In claiming so, they confound the 
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individual trait stratum with the demarcation stratum: demarcation 
criteria and the relevant individual traits underlying mental disorders 
may not always match. A range of traits, including physiological ones, 
can underlie syndromes without there being a need to include those 
traits in demarcation criteria. For example, individual traits relevant to 
Pete’s ADHD may include various traits pertaining to his structural and 
functional neuroanatomy such as anomalies in cortical thickness and in 
the default mode, frontoparietal and ventral attention networks (Park 
et al., 2018), traits pertaining to executive functioning, such as impair-
ments in functions like behavioral inhibition, working memory, and 
cognitive flexibility (Barkley, 1997), and behavioral traits ranging from 
motor hyperactivity to speaking out of turn (DSM-V).
However, defining a disorder for diagnostic purposes is not simply about 
making an inventory of all the relevant individual traits. Many of the 
individual traits relevant to ADHD are not specific to ADHD. For example, 
atypical functioning of the default, frontoparietal, and ventral attention 
networks is not only relevant for ADHD but also for schizophrenia (Park 
et al., 2018). Second, many of the relevant individual traits are not consistent 
among people who are affected by the disorder: if the disorder is subject to 
multiple realizability, the group of relevant traits may also be subject to 
some individual variance. Third, the heterogeneity and richness of many 
mental disorder categories merit some reduction when it comes to demar-
cation criteria. An exhaustive description of ADHD would be a great scien-
tific accomplishment, but it would be too elaborate to be clinically utilizable. 
Demarcation may not be a mere tool (depending on the degree to which one 
prioritizes pragmatist considerations in demarcation), but it is subject to the 
practical demands of clinical applicability.
A similar expectation of analogy can be found on the reductionist side of 
the debate. For example, Hoogman et al. interpret the results of their ”mega- 
analysis” of brain physiology in people with ADHD as demonstrating that 
“patients with ADHD have altered brains; therefore, ADHD is a disorder of 
the brain” (Hoogman et al. 2017: 311). Yet while they found structural 
individual traits about ADHD, it does not follow from these findings that 
ADHD would not have a social ontology on any of the explanatory strata 
discussed above. Its demarcation and instantiation can depend metaphysically 
on the social sphere even if it also, whether necessarily or contingently, 
involves “altered brains.”
Is there a way out of social ontology for the reductionist? Yes, on the 
stratum of individual traits: the reductionist may eschew behavioral 
traits in favor of traits on lower levels of biological organization than 
behavioral traits are and ground mental disorder on such traits alone. 
These include, e.g., structural traits, such as cortical volume, neural 
networks, and ultimately cells, chemicals, and molecules. Biological 
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constituents can be found for all mental disorders because all mental 
disorders are possessed by organisms; the trouble with reductionism is 
that it is very hard to find low-level constituents that would be specific 
to the mental disorders at hand. In the face of empirical research, there 
appear not to be dedicated physiological phenomena underlying specific 
mental disorders, but instead, many general processes, structures and 
mechanisms contribute to their causation and constitution (Kendler, 
2005, 2008; see also Koi, 2021).
As a result, there is considerable difficulty in demarcating mental dis-
orders directly by reference to low-level traits or in inferring their instantia-
tion from the same. It may be epistemically necessary to involve traits on the 
behavioral level. Nonetheless, whether something is a necessary constituent 
for mental disorder does not depend on whether it is a dedicated constituent 
for it. For the neuroreductionist, the lack of dedicated low-level biological 
traits highlights the importance of critically examining whether these need 
to be complemented with social constituents on the demarcation and 
instantiation strata, even if one holds that they suffice as the constituents 
of mental disorder. In other words, the reductionist may need to explicitly 
include the social sphere to do the work of demarcation and instantiation, 
since that work cannot be done by reference to low-level biological pro-
cesses alone.
6. Conclusion
The worry inherent in much of psychiatric reductionism is that were 
psychiatry dealing with social constructs, psychiatric medicine could not 
improve. But rather than denying the constitutive role of the social sphere in 
mental disorder, medicine would do well to seek to better understand it.
Above, I have established that realism about mental disorders is best 
understood as ITR about them and made the further claim that ITR is 
compatible with social ontology. This is not a particularly radical claim: 
many proponents of ITR endorse a conception of mental disorder where 
social norms and structures, institutional practices, history, etcetera play 
some sort of a part in the ontology of mental disorder. However, neither is 
this claim noncontroversial. Neuroreductionism about mental disorder still 
figures prominently in professional and lay debates concerning mental 
disorder. Not just neuroreductionists but also some proponents of complex 
models of mental disorder such as Kendler et al. (2011) reject social meta-
physics in order to make space for their approach. However, as I have 
demonstrated, rejecting the social metaphysics of mental disorder is an 
unnecessary move for defending ITR accounts.
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A plausible objection is that “biological” constituents may nevertheless be 
in some sense more important for mental disorder than social constituents 
are. Yet this criticism is harmless, because the present argument makes no 
claims regarding the relative weight of each constituent, whether ”biologi-
cal” or social.
I have argued that to meaningfully distinguish realism about mental 
disorders from exclusionary social ontology, it ought to be conceived as 
ITR about them. However, while ITR enables a meaningful contrast to 
exclusionary social ontology, it is compatible with inclusionary social 
ontology. Realists pursuing an accurate metaphysical description of men-
tal disorder ought to carefully consider and account for its social con-
stituents on any or each of the three strata of demarcation, instantiation, 
and individual traits.
Notes
1. See, e.g., Kendler’s (2016) eloquent protest to nonrealist views in the following quote: 
“Over history, many cultures have done a poor job of properly seeing the other in 
those who are psychiatrically ill. It has been too easy to deny their humanity, to say 
they are not really sick. I continue to feel an obligation to counter this position and 
argue for the reality of mental illness.” (Kendler, 2016, p. 6.)
2. The distinction between causal and constitutive social construction was made by 
Haslanger (1995). For a causal social constructionist account of mental disorder, see 
Church (2004).
3. While this paper focuses on explicating points of agreement among realists and 
assessing their compatibility with social metaphysics, realists about mental disorder 
are not a unified camp. Topics of debate among realists include, e.g., whether 
a correspondence theory or a coherence theory of truth is best suited for psycho-
pathology (Eronen, 2019; Kendler, 2016), and to what extent mental disorders are 
reducible to brain disorders – some (e.g., Insel & Cuthbert, 2015) urge hard reduc-
tionism about psychopathology, while others (Borsboom et al., 2019; Davies, 2016) 
are externalists about it.
4. This point is also made in Barnes (2017).
5. In the following, I will build on a biological conception of ”trait.” However, this is not to 
be taken as an endorsement of the misconception that disorders would be real to the 
extent that they are biological; I will explicitly criticize that conception in section 4, below.
6. Indeed, this is a criticism leveled against some diagnostic categories: for example, the 
reality of ADHD is questioned by leveling the charge that traits associated with 
ADHD in fact are traits shared among children (or, according to Timimi and 
Taylor (2004) among boys).
7. Note that a different, narrower conception of individual trait is used in personality 
psychology; in this paper, my intention is to use the individual trait concept in biology 
rather than that in personality psychology.
8. Notice that neither conclusion need entail that the suffering related to it ought not to 
be eased by medical and other caregiving.
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9. Essentialism about mental disorder (e.g., Kendell & Jablensky, 2003) is also an ITR 
stance. In it, individual traits that cluster together via their connection to a shared 
essence act as constituents of the mental disorder in question. I will not engage 
essentialism in depth in this essay because there is a widespread consensus that 
essentialism about mental disorders is false (see, e.g., Kendler et al., 2011; Zachar, 
2014).
10. For example, Timimi and Taylor (2004) bemoans how the diagnostic category of 
ADHD “leads to all of us – parents, teachers and doctors – disengaging from our 
social responsibility to raise well-behaved children. We thus become a symptom of the 
cultural disease we purport to cure” (ibid, p. 8). According to Timimi, Pete’s tragedy is 
that the incompetent upbringing he received as a child is misinterpreted as 
a nonexistent medical condition. Neuroreductionism has been one attempt to decisi-
vely resolve this matter in favor of grounding mental disorder on individual traits.
11. Kendler compares mental disorders to species, where “The features of a species 
typically vary over its range, and at its limits the dividing line between sister species 
can become indistinct [. . .] The species we know about only exist in our biosphere 
and are temporally limited, existing only between their emergence and extinction 
[. . .] species have no essence. There is no one thing that defines a species that makes 
a walrus, robin, or drosophila. Fourth, not all members of a species are identical to 
one another (2016: 6). For Kendler, mental disorders resemble species on all four 
counts.
12. Davies does not name his stance a social metaphysics, preferring the term external-
ism. However, Davies’ argument concerning the instantiation of mental disorder 
makes no use of the nonsocial environment. That there is no ODD in Davies’ utopia 
is due specifically to the differences in social structures.
13. As a further remark, that we take certain individuals with specific traits, regardless of 
their local culture, to have a mental disorder does not entail that the disorder would 
necessarily need to be presocial: rather, it can entail that similar cultural practices arise 
in various cultures due to factors such as cultural exchange and the sociobiological 
characteristics of Homo sapiens.
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